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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARY PAULEY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
CAROL ZARBOCK, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
12807 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff-appellant against defendant-
respondent for elleged personal injuries which she claims to 
have sustained as the result of a minor accident wherein the 
two vehicles involved merely touched one another at time of 
impact. The parties hereto were the drivers of the respective 
vehicles involved. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to a jury before the Honorable D. 
Frank Wilkins, one of the judges of the District Court of Salt 
lake County. The trial judge instructed the jury that defend-
ant was negligent as a matter of law but left the question of 
causation of bodily injury alleged to have been sustained by 
plaintiff up to the jury for resolution. As a result of its deliber-
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ations the jury found that the accident in question did not 
cause the injuries claimed by plaintiff and returned a verdict of 
no cause of action in favor of defendant. 
Subsequently plaintiff made Motions for Judgment Not-
withstanding the Verdict (R 118, 119) and for New Trial 
(R 123) both of which Motions were denied by the Trial 
Court. 
RELlEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent seeks to have the Order of the 
Trial Court affirmed which denied plaintiff-appellant's Motions 
for Judgment Notwithstanding the Jury Verdict and for New 
Trial and further seeks to have the Jury Verdict in this matter 
left undisturbed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about December 5, 1967, plaintiff, Mary Pauley, 
was stopped at the drive-in window to make a deposit at the 
Valley Bank and Trust Company, Cottonwood Branch (R 1, 
15 0-151, T 9-10) . While she was sitting there in her car de· 
fendant, Carol Zarbock, approached the drive-in window in 
her car also in anticipation of transacting some business at the 
bank ( R 297, T 161). As she approached the place she would 
stop in line behind plaintiff's vehicle the front of defendant's 
car came in contact with plaintiff's car. Plaintiff, Mrs. Pauley, 
describes the impact as a "terrific jolt" (R. 151, T 10). While 
defendant, Carol Zarbock, described the impact as follows: 
"Well, I could feel that I had touched her car. I could feel 
that I had" (R 300, T 164). Defendant also stated that she 
was traveling between one and two miles per hour when her 
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vehicle touched plaintiff's automobile (R 300, T 164). De-
fendant introduced photographs of both vehicles as they ap-
peared immediately after the impact. Exhibit 2-D shows the 
front end of the vehicle defendant was driving and also shows 
it as it appeared immediately after impact (R 303, T 167)~ 
Exhibits 4-D and 5-D both show the vehicle Mrs. Pauley was 
driving at the time of the accident with 5-D showing the rear 
of the Pauley vehicle ( R 3 04, 168) . A cursory examination 
of the photographs reveals that neither car sustained any dam-
age in the accident and in fact it is impossible to tell where the 
two vehicles came in contact with one another. Indeed, neither 
plaintiff nor any other person made claim for any damage to 
the Pauley vehicle and no evidence was introduced to show that 
it sustained any damage in the accident. Certainly, the Zar-
bock vehicle was not damaged. 
After the accident and before plaintiff reached home she 
states that she developed a lump the size of an egg which was 
painful on the right side of her neck (R 153, T 12). She con-
tacted and saw Dr. Clifford Cutler relative to this. Dr. Cutler 
was not called as a witness by plaintiff in order to describe to 
the jury what his examination of plaintiff revealed or about his 
prescribed course of treatment. 
Plaintiff was subsequently examined and treated by Dr. 
La Verne Erickson, a neurosurgeon in Salt Lake City, who did 
testify in plaintiff's behalf (R 194, T 54; R 233, T 94). 
Dr. Erickson first saw plaintiff on March 22, 1968 (R 
196, T 56) at which time she complained of pain on the left 
side of her neck which pain went down into her shoulder. 
Plaintiff had a migraine headache problem prior to her accident 
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with defendant and Dr. Erickson felt that her problems were a 
combination of her prior problems and any injury received in 
the accident with defendant. On that occasion Dr. Erickson 
did a brief general neurological examination of plaintiff and 
the only positive findings being some mild difference in the re. 
flexes. In that regard the left upper extremity was less active 
than the right (R 198, T 59). There was no positive findings 
at the time of trial and for some time prior thereto ( R 198, 
T 5 9). Plaintiff had submitted to two myelograms but neither 
of them showed any significant abnormality (R 199, T 60). 
Dr. Erickson saw plaintiff about nine times in all and 
did discover that she had had an injury in December, 1966 
where she injured her neck (R 197, T 57). 
Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Chester B. Powell, a neuro· 
surgeon of Salt Lake City, who also testified at the trial. He 
examined plaintiff at the request of counsel for defendant (R 
260, T 124). Dr. Powell first saw plaintiff on December 30, 
1969. At that time he gave her a neurologic exam and also 
reviewed reports of the examinations and findings of other 
doctors and examined x-rays of plaintiff (R 261, T 125). 
After taking a history from plaintiff and then examining her 
Dr. Powell found plaintiffs physical condition to be normal. 
He testified that when he saw Mrs. Pauley she was in no ap· 
parent difficulty and was in good health. She wore a cervical 
collar at the time, but when it was removed she had normal 
spontaneous movements of the head and neck without any 
apparent limitations. He further stated that she had good pos· 
ture and had good range of motion at all levels of the spine (R 
4 
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262, T 126). After stating that the results of his neurologic 
exam of plaintiff was fully normal (R 264, T 125) Dr. Powell 
stated his diagnosis of Mrs. Pauley's condition as follows: 
First, in taking the history she gave me, the his-
tory of three separate injuries, so my impression was, 
first, that she had this history of injuries with possible 
sprain of the neck or aggravation of sprain from a previ-
ous injury and possibly in view of a complaint of some 
discomfort in her left shoulder, some irritation of the 
nerve root. However, in the second place, I could find 
no evidence by the examination, by the tests and x-rays 
which I reviewed of any specific disorder of which we 
could make a diagnosis, accounting for the symptoms 
other than the possibility of sprain. 
The record also reveals that plaintiff had an accident in 
December, 1966 when she slipped on the ice and hurt herself 
in the parking lot of her employer, General Appliance Com-
pany. She was hospitalized as a result of that accident and 
was treated by both Dr. Cutler and Dr. Bernson (R 177, T 
37). Plaintiff had an onset of headaches which finally became 
so bad she couldn't stand it (R 178, T 38). She was hospital-
ized for about one week (R 178, T 38), where she under-
went traction (R 179, T 39) and had physical therapy treat-
ments for about two months (R 179, T 39). 
Plaintiff also admitted that she was involved in another 
automobile accident subsequent to the one with defendant. She 
was driving an automobile that was struck from the rear by a 
car driven by a Grace Harrington in July, 1969 (R 184, T 44). 
She stated that she had never been free of pain from the time 
of the accident with defendant up to the time of trial (R 190, 
T 50). However, defendant called as a witness Mr. John Ware, 
an adjuster for Nationwide Insurance Company, the liability 
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insurance carrier of Grace Harrington (R 290, T 154; R 291, 
T 155). He stated that in settlement negotiations with plain. 
tiff and her attorney on the Harrington accident that plain-
tiff's physical condition had been discussed as that related to 
any injury received in the accident with defendant (R 292, 
T 156). In discussing this matter Mr. Ware said at R 293, 
T 157: 
Mrs. Pauley said to me that she had been released 
by her physician as it relates to injuries received prior 
to the accident of July, 1969. She said that she had 
physical problems directly related to an accident occur-
ring in July of 1969 for which she was making claim 
against Nationwide. 
Q. (by Mr. Christian) Was there anything else 
to the conversation? 
A. She told - she described herself for me as 
a sports enthusiast. She told me that since the accident 
of July, '69 that her abilities to participate in the sports 
which she liked to follow was greatly curtailed. She 
also told me that she, prior to that - immediately 
prior to that accident, she told me that she had felt 
good, and, of course, related as I said, certain treat· 
ments and expenses which were directly related to an 
accident occurring in July of '69. 
After the parties had rested their case; the Court gave 
the jury 21 instructions for their guidance in deciding the case. 
Several of the pertinent and significant instructions were In· 
structions 3, 4, 5 and 9 which as given by the Court are as 
follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
You are the exclusive judges of the believability 
of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. In 
judging the weight of the testimony and believability 
of the witnesses, you have a right to take into consid· 
eration their bias, their interest in the result of the suit, 
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or any probable motive or lack thereof to testify fairly 
if any is shown. You may consider the witnesses' con-
duct upon the witness stand; the reasonableness of their 
statements; their apparent frankness, or the want of it; 
their opportunity to know; their ability to understand, 
and their capacity to remember. You should consider 
these matters together with all of the other facts and 
circumstances which you may believe have a bearing on 
the truthfulness or accuracy of the witnesses' state-
ments. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
A witness may be impeached by contradictory 
evidence or by evidence that on some former occasion, 
he or she made statements or conducted himself or her-
self in a manner inconsistent with his or her present 
testimony. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
If you believe any witness has wilfully testified 
falsely as to any material matter, you may disregard 
the entire testimony of such witness, except as such 
testimony may have been strengthened or confirmed 
by other believable evidence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit 
the opinion of a witness to be received as evidence. 
One exception to this rule exists in the case of expert 
witnesses. A person who by education, study and ex-
perience has become an expert in any art, science or 
profession, and who is called as a witness, may give 
his opinion as to any such matter in which he is versed 
and which is material to the case. You should con-
sider such expert opinion and should weigh the reasons, 
if any, given for it. You are not bound, however, by 
such an opinion. Give it the weight to which you deem 
it entitled, whether that be great or slight, and you may 
reject it, if in your judgment the reasons given for it 
are unsound. 
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After having instructed the jury that defendant was neg!i. 
gent as a matter of law, the trial court left the question of 
whether the injuries that plaintiff complained of were proxj. 
mately caused by defendant's negligence (Instructions 14, R 
68). 
The jury decided that they were not and accordingly re-
turned its verdict in favor of defendant and against plaintiff 
no cause of action. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JUDGMENT AND PROCEEDINGS IN 
THE LOWER COURT ARE PRESUMED BY 
THE REVIEWING COURT ON APPEAL TO BE 
CORRECT 
The cases are legion supporting the general proposition of 
law stated in Point I, and especially as it applies to the instant 
case. No cases have been found by respondent stating a con· 
trary position. 
Not only is there a presumption of validity on appeal 
of the judgment and proceedings in the lower court, but the 
burden is on the appellate affirmatively to demonstrate error, 
and in the absence of such the judgment must be affirmed by 
the reviewing court. Leithead v. Adair, 10 U.2d 282, 351 
Pac. 2d 956; Coombs v. Perry, 2 U.2d 381, 275 Pac.2d 680. 
Again, on appeal the judgment of the trial court is presump· 
tively correct and every reasonable intendment must be in· 
dulged in by the appellate court in favor of it. Burton v. Zions 
Co-operative Mercantile Institution, 122 U. 360, 249 Pac.2d 
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514; Nagle v. Club Fontainbleu, 17 U.2d 125, 405 Pac.2d 346; 
Petty v. Gindy Manufacturing Corporation, 17 U.2d 32, 404 
Pac.2d 30. 
This proposition of law is correct and is binding upon the 
appellate court whether the proceedings in the lower court are 
before a judge only or a judge and jury. And the rule seems 
to have even more weight in the latter instance. When the trial 
court has given its approval to the determination by the jury 
by refusing to grant a new trial to the losing party, the appel-
late court will look upon the judgment of the trial court with 
some degree of verity with a presumption in favor of its valid-
ity, and again the burden is upon the appellate to show some 
persuasive reason for upsetting it. Gordon v. Provo City, 15 
U.2d 287, 391 Pac.2d 430. In the same vein, it has been held 
that where a jury trial has been had and a motion for a new 
trial denied to the losing party, the presumptions are in favor 
of the judgment entered and the Supreme Court will not dis-
turb that judgment unless the appellant meets the burden of 
showing error and prejudice which deprived it of a fair trial. 
Lemmon v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 
9 U.2d 195, 341 Pac.2d 215. 
Other cases supporting this proposition are Charlton v. 
Hackett, 11 U.2d 389, 360 Pac.2d 176; Universal Investment 
Company v. Carpets, Inc., 16 U.2d 336, 400 Pac.2d 564; Tay-
lor v. Johnson, 15 U.2d 342, 398 Pac. 2d 382; Wendelboe v. 
Jacobson, 10 U.2d 344, 353 Pac.2d 178; Hadley v. Wood, 9 
U.2d 366, 345 Pac.2d 197; Daisy Distributors, Inc. v. Local 
Union 976, Joint Council 67, Western Conference of Team-
sters, 8 U.2d 124, 329 P.2d 414. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUS-
ING TO FIND THAT THE NEGLIGENT ACTS 
OF DEFENDANT PROXIMATELY CAUSED 
THE INJURIES COMPLAINED OF BY PLAIN-
TIFF 
It is Hornbook Law that even though there is negligence 
on the part of a tort feasor that negligence must be the proxi-
mate cause of the injuries sustained or complained of by the 
plaintiff before recovery can be had. Hill v. Mathew Paint 
Company, 149 Cal. App. 2d 714, 308 Pac.2d 865; Mitchell v. 
Branch, 363 Pac.2d 969 Hawaii; Chatterton v. Pocatello 
Post, 70 Idaho 480, 223 Pac.2d 389; Mills v. State Automo· 
bile Insurance Association, 183 Kan. 268, 326 Pac.2d 254; 
Mahan v. Hafen, 76 Nev. 220, 351 Pac.2d 617; Duncan Bro· 
thers v. Robinson, 294 Pac.2d 822 (Okla); Schutt v. Hill, 193 
Ore. 18, 236 Pac.2d 937. And as a general rule defendant will 
not be liable for plaintiff's injuries unless his negligence proxi-
mately caused the said injuries. Glen v. Gibbons and Reed 
Company, 1 U.2d 308, 265 Pac.2d 1013. It is also uncontro-
verted and uncontrovertable that questions of negligence, con· 
tributary negligence and proximate cause in an automobile 
collision case are ordinarily for the jury. Oflkman v. Jensen, 
218 Pac.2d 682 (Utah); Earl v. Salt Lake and Utah Railway 
Corporation, 109 U. 111, 165 Pac.2d 877; Hayden v. Cedar· 
land, 1 U.2d 171, 263 Pac.2d 796; Gibbs v. Blue Cab, 249 
Pac.2d 213 (Utah) rehearing, 259 Pac.2d 294. 
The case of Jensen v. Taylor, 2 U.2d 196, 271 Pac.2d 
838 (1954) was an action for damage sustained by plaintiff 
when an automobile in which he was riding as a guest passen· 
ger was struck by a fire truck driven by the defendant. The 
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evidence produced at the trial was apparently in conflict and 
the District Court, Judge A. H. Ellett, denied the Motion for 
Directed Verdict and submitted the case to the jury and thereto 
denied defendant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Jury Verdict and for New Trial and the defendant appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Judge Worthen, held that questions of 
negligence and contributory negligence and proximate cause 
in this case were properly submitted to the jury and the gen-
eral rule is to that effect. See also, Caperon v. Tuttle, 100 U. 
476, 116 Pac.2d 402. 
Appellant in its Brief claims that the evidence adduced at 
the trial is so overwhelming and convincing that the trial court 
was in error in not instructing the jury as a matter of law that 
defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries 
complained of by plaintiff. With all due respect to the position 
of appellant in this matter it does not seem to be that clear 
to the respondent. Appellant asserts in Point II of his Brief 
in support of his position that proximate cause as a matter of 
law must be founded upon a stipulation by counsel for defend-
ant on the medical bills incurred by the plaintiff. However, in 
examination of the record in this matter will indicate and show 
the following statement made by counsel for defendant in re-
lation to that matter: 
MR. CHRISTIAN: I'll be happy to. [Stipulate.} 
If the proper persons were called to testify, they would 
testify that the charges I shall indicate were charges 
made for services performed for and on behalf of Mrs. 
Pauley, and that the charges so made were so reason-
able. I do not stipulate, however, that the services per-
formed were necessary, nor do I stipulate that we are 
responsible therefor .... (R 164, T 23). 
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It is obvious from what the record reveals in that regard, 
that the stipulation as related to the medical bills of plaintiff 
was not intended to be at the time it was made nor could it 
reasonably be inferred to be a basis for finding as a matter of 
law causation in this case and respondent respectfully asserts 
that appellant does violence to the facts as revealed in the 
record in this matter in attempting to make the stipulation 
form such a basis. Far more significant in consideration of this 
case, however, are the instructions which the Court gave to the 
Jury. The jury was adequately and properly instructed in this 
case. 
In the Court's Instruction No. 3, he advised the jury that 
they were the exclusive judges of the believability of the wit-
nesses and the weight of the evidence and that they could take 
into consideration the witnesses interest in the lawsuit, motive 
or lack thereof to testify fairly. They could also consider the 
witnesses conduct on the stand, the reasonableness of their 
statements, apparent frankness, or want of it, their opportunity 
to know, etc. 
The jury was also told in Instruction No. 5 that if they 
believed that if any witness testified falsely as to a material 
matter they could disregard the entire testimony of such wit-
ness, except as that testimony was strengthened by other be-
lievable evidence. 
The record clearly shows that plaintiff claimed after the 
impact, while on the way home, she developed pain in her neck 
and a lump on the right side thereof about the size of an egg. 
She immediately contacted Dr. Cutler and went to him for 
examination and treatment and was treated and examined by 
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the doctor over a period of time. However, Dr. Cutler was not 
called to testify relative to his findings or plaintiff's condition 
immediately after the accident. Plaintiff also stated on the 
stand that she had not had one day free of pain from the time 
of the accident with defendant until the accident with Mrs. 
Harrington in July of 1969. However, over plaintiff's objec-
tion defendant was able to produce a witness, Mr. John Ware, 
whom plaintiff told that she had been released from her doctor, 
that she was feeling good prior to the accident of July, 1969, 
that she had been active and enthusiastic in sports but the 
accident of 1969 had curtailed her activities in that regard. 
Counsel for plaintiff was unable to impeach Mr. Ware 
in his testimony. It is certainly not beyond the realm of rea-
sonableness that the jurors believed that in this regard the 
plaintiff was testifying falsely and she may well have been, and 
if they so believed they were instructed by the Court that they 
were entitled to disregard her entire testimony or any part 
thereof, which they may well have done. If they disregarded 
her testimony as to her injury or any part thereof, the jury may 
have honestly felt that Mrs. Pauley was not injured in the 
accident. Certainly such a finding would be supported by the 
evidence revealed in Exhibits 2-D through 5-D which were 
photographs of the two vehicles involved shortly after the 
accident and which showed the vehicles as they appeared im-
mediately after the impact and there was no evidence of dam-
age to either car nor was it possible to determine by examining 
the photographs where the two vehicles came in contact. To 
support this plaintiff made no claim for damage to her auto-
mobile. The fair inference from that being that the vehicle 
was not damaged in the accident. 
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The jorors who finally sat to hear this case were approved 
by both counsel for plaintiff and defendant. They were neither 
wild-eyed liberals nor were they brooding conservatives, but 
a group of plaintiff's peers who sat for two days, listened at-
tentively to the evidence presented, listened attentively to the 
Court's Instructions and then retired to the jury room to there 
render a true and just verdict. It was their feeling, even after 
having been instructed by the Judge, that defendant was negli-
gent, that plaintiff received no injury from the accident, even 
though she had incurred substantial medical bills. Interest-
ingly enough, plaintiff sustained an injury in December of 
1966 which required hospitalization, the alleged injury in 
December of 1967 and another injury in July of 1969. Con-
sidering all of this evidence coupled with plaintiff's doctor, Dr. 
LaVerne Erickson, that when he saw plaintiff the only positive 
findings after a neurologic examination of plaintiff's condition 
was a mild discrepancy in the reflexes of the left upper ex-
tremities. 
Dr. Powell, who is also a neurosurgeon in Salt Lake City 
and who admittedly saw plaintiff considerably later than Dr. 
Erickson, stated that he found no objective signs or evidence 
of injury to plaintiff and in fact found his examination of her 
to be completely normal. 
It should also be noted that the Instructions relative to 
believability of witnesses and false testimony are stock Instruc-
tions from Jury Instruction Forms for Utah, which instruc-
tions have been approved and adopted by the Courts in this 
state. If the jurors are not the exclusive judges of the credibility 
and believability of the witnesses and if the jurors are not en-
titled to believe any witness testified falsely or if the jurors 
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are not entitled to disregard the testimony of a witness they 
believe has testified falsely then the attorneys of the Trial Bar, 
the Bar Association and the Courts of this state make a mockery 
of the instructions which they give to the jury wherein they 
instruct them that they are the exclusive witnesses and that 
they may disregard the testimony of a witness who they have 
believed testified falsely. 
Taking all of the evidence into consideration and con-
sidering the well established general rule that proximate cause 
is a jury question it is the contention of the respondent herein 
that the trial court acted properly in submitting that question 
to the jury for its resolution. And that since reasonable minds 
could differ as to whether or not plaintiff even suffered any 
injury, especially if one believes that she testified falsely on 
the stand, then the question was properly submitted to the jury 
and should not be overturned by the trial court or the appel-
late court. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUS-
ING TO DIRECT A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF 
PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST DEFENDANT. 
Respondent incorporates by reference into Point III here-
of the facts, law and arguments made in Point II of this Brief. 
In directing a verdict in favor of plaintiff and against the 
defendant in this matter, the Court was required to view and 
examine the evidence in a light most favorable to the defend-
ant and it is certainly not the province of the Court to weigh 
or determine preponderance of the evidence. Boskovich v. 
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Utah Construction Company, 123 U. 387; Finlayson v. Brady, 
121 U. 204, Pac.2d 491; Nielson v. Hermanson, 109 U. 180 , 
166 Pac.2d 536. 
Again, in granting a Motion for Directed Verdict or for a 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, all testimony and all 
reasonable inferences flowing therefrom which tend to prove 
the case of the party against whom the verdict is to be directed 
or the Motion granted must be accepted as true and all conflicts , 
and all evidence which tend to disprove that must be disre-
garded. Kaer v. Mayfair Markets, 19 U.2d 339, 431 Pac.2d 
566; Smith v. Franklin, 14 U.2d 16, 376 Pac.2d 541. 
In the case on appeal herein, if the trial court had direct· 
ed the verdict as plaintiff contends, they would have to have 
found the evidence as submitted by the plaintiff true and all 
reasonable inferences therefrom and totally disregarded any of 
the evidence produced by the defendant. And as a matter of 
fact the Court would have had to accept the testimony of plain· 
tiff as being true while disregarding the significant testimony 
of Dr. La Verne Erickson, her own doctor as not being true. 
It would have also required the Court to place itself in a posi-
tion of being the exclusive judge of the credibility of the wit· 
nesses and would have deprived the jury of the right to believe 
or disbelieve any of the witnesses which testified. It also means 
that the Court would have to accept the testimony of plaintiff 
as being true as a matter of law. 
The jury may well have disregarded all of plaintiff's 
testimony by reason of inconsistent statements made by her 
to Mr. John Ware, the claims adjuster for Nationwide Insur· 
ance Company, and the statement made on the stand. Re· 
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spandent respectfully contends and asserts that the position ad-
vocated by the plaintiff in its Brief is untenable, unjust, in-
equitable and in error. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PER-
MITTING THE TESTIMONY OF JOHN M. 
WARE OVER OBJECTION OF PLAINTIFF'S 
COUNSEL 
Under Point III of its Brief appellant spends considerable 
time relative to the cross-examination of plaintiff by counsel 
for the defendant and especially as that cross-examination re-
lated to medical expenses incurred by plaintiff from the auto-
mobile accident of July, 1969 and settlement negotiations 
which she had with Mr. John Ware also in relation to that 
accident. A canvas of the record in this matter shows that no 
objection was made by counsel for plaintiff to that line of 
questioning by defendant's attorney and plaintiff cannot now 
be heard to raise a belated objection thereto. In any event it 
cannot be seriously argued that counsel for defendant could not 
go into the matter of medical expenses incurred by plaintiff as a 
result of the second accident as probative of the extent of 
injuries received in the second accident when plaintiff claimed 
that those injuries were not in any way related to the injuries 
received in the accident with Mrs. Zarbock in December of 
1967. None of the settlement negotiations which plaintiff and 
her attorney entered into with John Ware were brought out in 
the testimony of Mr. Ware. It will be recalled that Mrs. Pauley 
testified on cross-examination that she had never recovered or 
was never free from pain from the injuries received in the 
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accident with Mrs. Zarbock in December of 1967 up to the 
time of the accident with Mrs. Grace Harrington in July of 
1969. 
The plaintiff further testified, after having been given a 
chance to retract that statement, that she had never made any 
statement inconsistent with that or she did not recall such. 
Thereupon defendant called Mr. John Ware who had had dis-
cussions with Mrs. Pauley in the presence of her counsel rela-
tive to her condition as that related to the accident with Mrs. 
Zarbock. Mr. Ware testified that Mrs. Pauley had told him 
that she had been released from her doctor from any injury 
sustained in the accident with defendant herein and that she 
was feeling fine before the accident with his insured, Mrs. 
Grace Harrington, in July of 1969, that prior to the July, 1969 
accident she had been a sports enthusiast and had certainly 
engaged in sports activities but her activities were greatly cur-
tailed by reason of the subsequent accident. 
Such testimony of Mr. Ware, if believed, puts the plain-
tiff in the position of making grossly inconsistent statements 
about what her condition was. She testified and wanted the 
jury to believe in the instant case that all of her medical prob-
lems were directly attributable to the accident with the de-
fendant, Mrs. Zarbock. However, when she attempted to settle 
the claim she had against Mrs. Harrington with Mr. Ware she 
wanted to make him believe that she had completely recovered 
from any injuries sustained in the Zarbock accident, whatever 
they were, and that all of her problems after July of 1969 were 
directly caused by Mrs. Harrington. 
Respondent respectfully asserts that plaintiff knowingly 
laid herself wide open for impeachment in this case and was 
effectively impeached. As has been previously indicated, the 
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jury may well have thought that she wilfully testified falsely 
because of her monetary interest in this case and that being so 
the jury was properly instructed that they could disbelieve any 
part of her testimony or reject it all. Such impeachment was 
consistent with the Court's Instruction No. 4, wherein the 
jury was advised that a witness may be impeached by contra-
dictory evidence or by evidence that on some former occasion 
she made statements inconsistent with her testimonay at the 
time. 
Appellant claims that Mr. Ware's testimony was preju-
dicial to her position in this case. With that position respond-
ent certainly agrees if you take into consideration that plaintiff 
prejudiced her own position by the inconsistent contradictory 
statements which she made. If it is true that Mr. Ware's testi-
mony was prejudicial to plaintiff in this case, it certainly was 
not improper. 
POINT V 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR AND ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FO RA NEW TRIAL 
Respondent will attempt to meet the arguments contained 
in Points IV and V of appellant's Brief under this heading of 
the respondent's Brief. 
It is of interest to note that plaintiff obviously thinks in-
justice was done in this matter because she did not win the 
lawsuit. All parties are generally wooed by their own position 
and feel that a travesty occurs if the merit of their position is 
not seen by others. 
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Appellant cites several cases under Point IV of its Brief 
relating to the power of the Courts to increase an inadequate 
award. Respondent respectfully contends that the cases cited by 
appellant are not in point. Those cases relate to findings by 
the jury where the plaintiff was entitled to an award of some 
kind and that based on the evidence as to what the injury 
was, supported by the juries finding that an award should be 
made, then in that event the Courts are able to determine the 
inadequacy of the award. However, in the instant case the 
jury, after hearing and weighing all of the evidence, decided 
that plaintiff was not entitled to any award. It goes without 
saying that the Court cannot review the inadequacy of that 
award since the jury found that the plaintiff was not injured 
in the automobile collision with Mrs. Zarbock and therefore 
not entitled to anything. 
Respondent does not contend that different people may 
not have different viewpoints about the jury's verdict in this 
case. But does strongly argue that reasonable people could 
well differ as to what the evidence meant and also as to whether 
or not Mrs. Pauley had any injury in the accident with Mrs. 
Zarbock and to the extent thereof. It is for this reason that 
reasonable minds could differ and that the jury verdict must be 
left undisturbed. 
A trial court is without power to change a jury's verdict 
or render a judgment for a greater or lesser amount than that 
specified in the verdict unless the prevailing party consents 
to the reduction, or the losing party consents to the increase. 
Bourne v. Moore, 77 U. 184, 292 Pac.2d 1102. 
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Motion for new trials are alawys addressed to the sound 
discretion of the Court and whether granted or denied the dis-
cretion of the trial court will be presumed to have been prop-
erly exercised and will be so held unless the contrary be made 
clearly to appear. Lehi Irrigation Company v. Moyle, 4 U. 
327, 9 Pac. 867. 
It is axiomatic in this state that the granting or 
refusing of Motions for New Trial is a discretionary matter. 
Uptown Appliance and Radio Company, Inc. v. Flint, 122 U. 
298, 249 Pac.2d 826. 
A court that vacates a verdict and grants a new trial by 
merely setting up his opinion or judgment against that of the 
jury ursurps the judicial power and prostitutes the constitutional 
trial by jury. Uptown Appliance and Radio Company, Inc. v. 
Flint, supra. 
The above cited cases clearly show that the granting or 
refusing to grant a new trial is a discretionary matter with the 
trial court and that appellant must show clearly that the trial 
court abused such discretion. Respondent believes that no 
such showing has been made or can be made in this case. Cer-
tainly, the trial judge in this matter has disposed of plaintiff's 
Motions on what he knew the law to be in this state - that on 
the question of damages in a tort action the parties are entitled 
to the unprejudiced judgment of a jury and the trial court may 
not set up its own view as to the amount of damages a party 
is entitled to recover as against a verdict of the jury. Bourne v. 
Moore, supra. 
The trial of cases by jury still have some validity in our 
system of jurisprudence and hopefully that condition will re-
main. The trial judge in this case elected not to prostitute that 
time honored system by substituting his judgment for the jury 
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even though he may have disagreed with the jury's verdict. Re. 
spondent does not mean to imply that the trial judge did dis. 
agree with it however. 
If, however, as plaintiff contends that jury verdicts are 
good, just and true so long as they square with plaintiff's de-
sires or with that of a trial judge then the time for trial of jury 
cases in our system is long since gone. Obviously, the trial 
judge in this matter felt that the jury having heard the testi· 
mony of all the witnesses, seen and examined the exhibits in-
troduced into the evidence, listened to the trial court's instruc-
tions, heard and considered the argument of counsels, was well 
aware of the facts of this case as it related to negligence, proxi-
mate cause, causation, injury and damages, if any. The jury 
having given of their time, having been attentive during the 
course of the trial and diligent in achieving a true and just 
verdict which they swore to do rendered a verdict of no cause 
of action in favor of defendant and against plaintiff, which 
verdict was unanimous as far as the jurors were concerned. 
Respondent respectfully takes the position that had the 
trial court set aside the jury verdict or granted a new trial, that 
a grave miscarriage of justice would have been done. And fur· 
ther contends that the appellate court herein must affirm the 
trial court in this matter and leave the jury verdict undisturbed 
if justice is to be achieved. 
CONCLUSION 
It is abundantly dear that the question of proximate 
cause, nature and extent of injury and damages were properly 
submitted for the jury's determinations, and that such questions 
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were for the jury's determinations since reasonable minds could 
differ as to whether or not the plaintiff was injured at all in 
the accident with defendant and, if so, to what extent she was 
injured. 
Having properly submitted those questions to the jury 
and the jury having found in favor of the defendant, the trial 
court refused to grant plaintiff's Motion for New Trial. The 
evidence from the record justifies the action taken by the C.Ourt 
and the jury. 
Based upon the foregoing facts, authorities and argument 
defendant urges this C.Ourt to affirm the judgment of the trial 
court upon the jury verdict and its order denying plaintiff's 
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Jury Verdict and 
for New Trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
D. GARY GIRISTIAN 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN 
520 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: (801) 521-3773 
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